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The debt crisis in several member states of the euro area has raised doubts on the viability of 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the future of the euro. While the launch of 
the euro in 1999 stirred a lot of interest in regional monetary integration and even monetary 
unification in  various parts of the world, including East Asia, the current crisis has had the 
opposite effect, even raising expectations of a breakup of the euro area. Indeed, the crisis has 
highlighted the problems and tensions that will inevitably arise within a monetary union when 
imbalances build up and become unsustainable. This note discusses the causes of the current 
European crisis and the challenges that EMU countries face in solving it. Based on this analysis, 
it derives five lessons for regional financial and monetary cooperation and integration in East 
Asia. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Europe currently faces a severe financial crisis. The debt crisis in several member states of the 
euro area has raised doubts about the viability of European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) and the future of the euro. 
While the launch of the euro in 1999 created a lot of interest in regional monetary integration 
and even monetary unification in various parts of the world, including East Asia, the present 
crisis has had the opposite effect, even raising expectations of a breakup of the euro area. The 
crisis has highlighted the problems and tensions that will inevitably arise within a monetary 
union when imbalances build up and become unsustainable. 
The objective of this paper is twofold: First, it reviews the causes of the European crisis and 
explains why the crisis of Greece—a small country accounting for less than 3% of the euro 
area’s gross domestic product (GDP)—could cause so much havoc. Second, it aims to draw 
lessons that East Asian countries can pick up from the European turmoil so they can pursue 
further successful economic integration and reduce the risk of  financial and exchange rate 
crises. It will not discuss solutions to the European crisis since this would be a subject rich 
enough for a separate paper. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the causes of the 
European crisis. Section 3 then draws five  lessons from the European crisis for financial 
regionalism in East Asia. Section 4 concludes. 
2.  THE CAUSES OF THE EUROPEAN CRISIS 
European countries had just weathered the 2008–2009 crisis and hopes were set for recovery, 
when  in Greece on 5 November 2009 George Papandreou’s freshly elected Socialist 
government revealed that the predecessor government had misled the public about the true 
state of Greece’s public finances and that the budget deficit for 2009 would be 12.7% of GDP—
more than double the previously published figure. On 8 December 2009, Fitch Ratings, which 
had cut Greece to A- when the higher deficit was revealed, cut Greek debt to BBB+, the first 
time in ten years that Greece was rated below investment grade. Standard & Poor’s followed 
suit on 16 December 2009 and cut Greece’s rating by one notch, to BBB-plus from A-minus, 
saying the announced austerity program was unlikely to produce a sustainable reduction in 
public debt. On 22 December 2009, Moody’s cut Greek debt to A2 from A1 over soaring deficits. 
The revelation of the true Greek fiscal situation raised serious doubts about the country’s ability 
to repay its debt. The following rating downgrades and ever rising interest rates led to a 
deterioration of Greece’s access to capital markets that made it ever more difficult and 
eventually impossible for the government to refinance itself, creating a downward spiral for the 
Greek economy. While government bond yields rose only modestly immediately after 5 
November, they had risen to unsustainable levels by March 2010 (Figure 1), prompting the euro 
area finance ministers in early April to put €30 billion in bilateral loans on standby for Greece—
with the Greek government insisting that it will not need to draw on these funds. By the end of 
the month, Greece was priced out of the international bond markets and turned to the European 
Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to activate a €45 billion bailout package. 
By early May 2010, the EU-IMF rescue package had to be increased to an amount of €110 
billion over three years, a sum that was further enlarged to a total of €130 billion in October 
2011. The bailout, however, failed to restore market trust in the Greek economy. Moreover, it 




Figure 1: 10 Year Government Bond Yields, January 2007–January 2012 
 
Source: Datastream. 
In particular, the Greek crisis and the hesitant political response from the other European 
countries raised concerns over the debt situation and the structural and competitiveness 
problems of the economically weaker periphery member countries of the euro area, which—in a 
slightly  derogatory  fashion—have been named  PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and 
Spain). As a consequence, the borrowing costs for the PIIGS increased significantly (Figure 1) 
and the cost of insuring sovereign debt against default soared (Figure 2) as trust in their ability 
to repay vanished. The crisis also raised awareness of the existing imbalances within the euro 
area, which constitute a serious problem. The remainder of this section will discuss the major 
causes of the crisis. ADBI Working Paper 347    Volz 
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Figure 2: Sovereign Credit Default Swaps, December 2007–January 2012 
 
Source: Datastream. 
Note: Scale for Greece is on the right axis. 
Banking crisis fuelling sovereign debt crisis and vice versa 
It is often wrongly assumed that the European debt crisis is primarily a result of thriftless 
government spending, especially due to lavish social security systems.
1
                                                 
1 The fact that the Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden are among the countries with the most 
generous and comprehensive social security systems (not only in Europe but in the world) but have sound public 
finances with relatively low debt-to-GDP ratios and are not affected by the crisis speaks for itself. 
 Rather, the origins of 
the European debt crisis can be directly traced back to the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, 
which spilled over into a sovereign debt crisis in several euro area countries in early 2010. To 
offset sharp falls in output, euro area governments (as governments in the rest of the world) 
responded with counter-cyclical fiscal policies that increased fiscal deficits. Moreover, fiscal 
positions worsened as tax revenues declined and transfer payments grew larger due to rising 
unemployment during the crisis. In many countries, government bailouts of banking systems 
also contributed to an increase in public debt. Private debt became public debt, be it through 
banking crises or the burst of housing bubbles, leading to sovereign crisis. Between 2007 and 
2010, the debt to GDP ratio of the euro area increased from 66.3% to 85.4% (Figures 3 and 4). ADBI Working Paper 347    Volz 
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Figure 3: Public Debt as % of GDP, 1995–2010 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Figure 4: Public Debt as % of GDP, 2007–2010 
 
Source: Eurostat. ADBI Working Paper 347    Volz 
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Greece is a special case in the sense that the level of Greek debt had already been very high 
before the crisis, at 107.7% of GDP in 2007. Greek debt, which has been on a continuous rise 
since 2003, reached a level of 144.9% of GDP in 2010. Like Greece, Italy had a debt level 
above 100% of GDP prior to the crisis, but unlike in the case of Greece the debt to GDP ratio 
fell between Italy’s adoption of the euro in 1999 and 2007. 
Among  euro area  countries, the most dramatic increase in public debt occurred in Ireland, 
where the country’s debt problems can be clearly ascribed to the country’s banking crisis. 
Ireland did not have a fiscal or debt problem until 2008. Indeed, between 1997 and 2007, 
Ireland had a fiscal surplus every year except for 2002, when the government recorded a tiny 
deficit of -0.4% of GDP. Accordingly, the Irish debt to GDP ratio declined steadily over this 
period from 64.3% in 1997 to 24.9% in 2007, with Ireland being one of the EU countries with the 
lowest public debt burden. The situation changed in the course of the Irish banking crisis in 
September 2008 when the Irish government—under pressure from European governments and 
institutions (including the European Central Bank, ECB) but also from the US government—
guaranteed most liabilities of Irish-owned banks.
2
Like Ireland, Spain did not have a fiscal or debt problem before 2008. In the period 1999–2007, 
Spain had an average annual budget surplus of 0.3% of GDP. In 2007, Spain even recorded a 
fiscal surplus of 1.9%. Until the outbreak of the global financial crisis, Spain did not violate a 
single time the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
 The government guarantee was initially €400 
billion but was later increased to €440 billion. As a consequence, the Irish deficit ballooned and 
the debt to GDP ratio shot up from 24.9% in 2007 to 94.9% in 2010. The ensuing deterioration 
of Ireland’s access to capital markets in the  autumn  of 2010 led it to seek an international 
financial rescue package by the IMF and the EU over €90 billion in November 2011 to finance 
its borrowing and bank recapitalization needs. According to FitzGerald and Kearney (2011), of 
the €148 billion of gross public debt at the end of 2010, €46.3 billion (or 30% of GDP) was due 
to government intervention in the banking system. This figure increased to €60 billion (about 
40% of GDP) by mid-2011. 
3
Even in Portugal—which was the first country to breach the SGP in 2002 and which had seen a 
steady increase of its debt to GDP ratio since joining the euro area in 1999 (when debt stood at 
49.6% of GDP)—the by far largest increase of public debt occurred during and after the 2008–
2009 crisis, with debt rising by 26.6% from 68.3% in 2007 to 94.9% in 2010. 
 Spain’s fortunes changed when the 
global financial crisis put an abrupt end to a long cycle of high growth (which started around 
1996) that had been accompanied by a construction and real estate boom (see, e.g., Suarez 
2010). When output contracted in 2008, the Spanish housing bubble burst and destabilized the 
banking system. The Spanish fiscal position deteriorated, with Spain recording fiscal deficits of -
4.5% in 2008, 11.2% in 2009, and -9.3% in 2010. Spain’s public debt rose from 36.5% of GDP 
in 2007 to 61.0% of GDP in 2010. 
Thus, the sovereign debt crisis has been directly linked to the global financial crisis and the 
ensuing  problems of European countries’ banking sectors after the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers. With deteriorating public finances, sovereign risk has increased and worsened bank’s 
balance sheets. As pointed out by Véron (2011: 5), the interdependence between sovereign 
                                                 
2 According to Darvas (2011), the balance sheet of Irish-owned banks was 3.7 times GDP in 2007; including 
international banks residing in Ireland the ratio was 7.1 times Irish GDP. Darvas cites figures from the Central Bank 
of Ireland according to which the total liabilities of the credit institutions resident in Ireland were €1,446 billion in 
September 2008, of which €787 billion was the liability of domestic banks. See Regling and Watson (2010) and 
McMahon (2010) for comprehensive analyses of the causes of Ireland’s banking crisis. 
3 The SGP requires EU member countries to have an annual budget deficit no higher than 3% of GDP and a national 
debt lower than 60% of GDP or approaching that value. ADBI Working Paper 347    Volz 
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credit and banking systems has been at the heart of the crisis since sovereign debt of euro area 
countries are held in large quantities by euro area banks, “with a significant bias for the bonds of 
the country in which the bank is headquartered but also significant cross-border exposures to 
other euro area countries’ sovereign debt”. Since most euro area  governments failed to re 
capitalize banks swiftly after the 2008–2009 crisis, their weak banks are now struggling severely 
with deteriorating sovereign risk. The fear that further bank bailouts will be needed, which in turn 
would strain public finances even more, increases sovereign risk further. Even the sovereign 
risk of the “healthier” euro area  countries has increased  among  fears of further sovereign 
bailouts, as governments have assumed guarantees for the financing operations of the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the euro area  financing arrangement that was 
created in June 2010 as part of the €750 billion European support package agreed upon in May 
2010. A vicious circle has been set in motion, in which “twin sovereign and banking crises […] 
mutually feed each other” and lead to a “gradual contagion to more countries and more asset 
classes” (Véron 2011: 1). 
Mispricing of risk and misallocation of capital 
An important element that contributed to the crisis was a mispricing of risk by capital markets 
and  an  ensuing  misallocation of capital in the decade before the outbreak of the crisis. 
European monetary unification brought about a convergence of interest rates among euro area 
members. Spreads of sovereign bonds of the PIIGS over Germany narrowed rapidly in the run-
up to EMU membership and almost disappeared once they had become members of the euro 
area (Figure 5). By January 2001, the time of Greece’s entry into the euro area, the yields on 
10-year Greek bonds had fallen to 5%—from 25% in 1992. Sovereign risk of virtually all euro 
area countries, including the PIIGS, was priced more or less the same as German sovereign 
debt. This was not least because the risk of euro area central government bonds was weighted 
at zero in regulatory capital calculations and because the Eurosystem (the ECB and the national 
central banks of the euro area) treated such debt with no haircut—basically as risk-free 
collateral—when these were offered as collateral for repos and other collateral financing trades 
(Véron 2011).
4
                                                 
4 This problem was highlighted early on by Buiter and Siebert (2005), among others, who maintained that the ECB’s 
open market operations created moral hazard by not discriminating sovereign risk within the euro area. 
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Figure 5: 10-Year Government Bond Yields (% per annum), October 1990–December 2011 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Mersch (2011: 6) points to flaws in the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP, which in his view were 
based on a “flawed economic paradigm” that was “characterized by a strong belief in the power 
of free markets to discipline governments”. With hindsight, it is now obvious that the availability 
of cheap credit led to an unsustainable accumulation of private (as in Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain) and public (as in Greece and Portugal) debt in today’s crisis countries. The drop in real 
interest rates in the periphery countries after their entry into the euro area and the inflowing 
capital fuelled unsustainable developments, including excessive credit dynamics and real estate 
bubbles in Spain and excessive fiscal spending in Greece. It also reduced the pressure for 
economic reform to improve competitiveness within the monetary union as countries could 
easily finance their current account deficits through an abundance of inflowing capital. 
Imbalances in the euro area 
A high level of public debt is not a problem per se, as long as the government is able to 
refinance itself and roll over its debt. This requires public debt and the interest burden to grow 
more slowly than the economy and the tax base. This is not the case in the PIIGS anymore. 
Today’s debt crisis in the PIIGS is therefore not merely a debt crisis; it is first and foremost a 
competitiveness and growth crisis that has led to structural imbalances within the euro area.
5
                                                 
5 Indeed, as discussed earlier, the level of debt in Spain was below the euro area average in 2010. 
 As 
Bergsten and Kirkegaard (2012: 1) point out, the “competitiveness crisis is manifest in large and 
persistent pre-crisis current account deficits in the euro area periphery and even larger intra-
euro area current account imbalances.” ADBI Working Paper 347    Volz 
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The lacklustre growth performance in the euro area periphery over the past years has been due 
to an erosion of competitiveness, both against other euro area countries and the rest of the 
world. The domestic booms resulting from low real interest rates and capital inflows after 
accession to EMU led to large wage increases in excess of productivity growth and hence rising 
unit labor costs (Figures 6 and 7) and higher price inflation than in Germany and other “core 
countries” of the euro area  (Figure 8). The result was an erosion of competitiveness of 
peripheral members of the euro area vis-à-vis the core countries, in particular Germany, which 
has been able to improve its price competitiveness significantly since the launch of the euro 
through wage constraints and structural reforms (e.g., Weidmann 2011). The appreciation of 
periphery countries’ real effective exchange rates (Figure 9) impaired export performance and 
caused large current account deficits (Figure 10). The latter have become increasingly difficult 
to finance since the outbreak of the crisis in 2010. Hence, “[b]elow the surface of the euro area’s 
public debt and banking crisis lies a balance-of-payments crisis caused by a misalignment of 
internal real exchange rates” (Mayer 2011: 1). 
Figure 6: Average Annual Wages (in 2009 US$, constant prices), 1990–2010 
 
Source: OECD. 
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Figure 7: Unit Labor Costs (OECD index base year 2005=100), 1990–2010 
 
Source: OECD. 
Figure 8: CPI (Differential over German CPI, in %), 1990–2010 
 
Source: IMF. 
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Figure 10: Current Account (quarterly data, in million US$), 1990Q1–2011Q1 
 
Source: IMF. 
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The structural imbalances, reflected by high current-account deficits of the periphery countries 
and matching surpluses in core countries, are at the heart of the current problems since a lack 
of competitiveness impedes the periphery countries’ chances of growing out of the crisis. To 
service their debt, deficit countries essentially need to become surplus countries. However, the 
fact that the PIIGS are members of a monetary union and hence cannot restore competitiveness 
by means of currency devaluation makes the adjustment much  more painful. An internal 
devaluation requires harsh structural adjustments and real wage cuts to push down costs. This 
is politically much more difficult to administer than one-off currency devaluation. As emphasized 
by Véron (2011), Weidmann (2011) and others, besides fiscal adjustment and bank 
restructuring, structural reforms that enhance the crisis countries’ growth potential are an 
indispensible dimension of any successful crisis resolution. It is the difficulties of economic 
adjustment—which require unpopular public policies—that have caused markets to doubt the 
solvency of the periphery countries. 
Lack of trust in European governments’ crisis response(s) 
The crisis is not merely an economic crisis. It is also a political crisis, stemming from erratic 
responses and tensions among euro area  governments—representing surplus and deficit 
countries with contradictory interests—quarrelling over the right crisis diagnosis and response. 
European leaders were caught wrong-footed in 2010, as they believed that a balance of 
payments crisis was impossible within a monetary union. Since such a crisis was not considered 
a priori, no crisis resolution mechanism had been put place.
6
The fears of the surplus countries, led by Germany, that an easy bailout of Greece would set a 
negative precedent and create moral hazard problems with other deficit countries—especially 
the larger euro area members Spain and Italy, both of which are considered “too big to save”—
prevented a quick resolution of the Greek crisis and led to piecemeal solutions, which were 
never comprehensive enough to end the crisis and eventually caused contagion to other weak 
euro countries. Worries of moral hazard and a “transfer union”, where deficit countries would 
have to be financed permanently through direct or indirect transfers and subsidies, made 
surplus countries also reluctant to endorse proposals such as those for eurobonds (e.g., von 
Weizsäcker and Delpla 2011) or a partial guarantee of all euro area sovereign bonds by the 
ECB (Wyplosz 2011).  A crisis resolution has been further complicated by the EU’s legal 
framework. In particular, the so-called “no bailout” clause (Article 125 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union) prohibits that a member of the EU assumes the debts of 
 European policymakers hence 
faced the challenge of crafting a crisis response from scratch in the midst of crisis, first agreeing 
on bilateral lending to Greece and when this appeared insufficient on the creation of the EFSF 
and the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM). This task has been complicated not 
only because the negotiations involve a large number of parties—besides the governments of 
the euro area member countries and the other EU members, the European Commission, the 
ECB, and the IMF have been involved—but also because the chosen crisis resolution measures 
have serious ramifications for the long-term institutional framework and functioning of the 
monetary union. As Bergsten and Kirkegaard (2012: 6) note: “Achieving the dual policy goals of 
solving a current crisis while trying also to prevent the next one—and using the same policy 
tools to do both—is rarely easy.” 
                                                 
6 Indeed, the EU’s Medium-term Financial Assistance facility, which was originally designed in 1970 to deal with 
balance of payments problems of all member states of the European Community/EU, has since 1999 been 
restricted to non-euro area member states only, that is, its members are all EU member countries which have not 
adopted the euro (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom). (McKay et al. 2010). ADBI Working Paper 347    Volz 
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another. Also, Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union forbids direct 
ECB credit to public institutions so as to avoid monetary financing of fiscal deficits.
7
The slow negotiation processes between governments, which have needed to secure support 
from their domestic constituencies, have evoked the impression of a “European political system 
[that] was ill-equipped to handle a financial crisis and lost control of events ... [, turning] a 
manageable solution into an increasingly unpredictable entanglement, in which potential losses 
are rising exponentially” (Ortiz 2011).
 
8
3.  LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN CRISIS FOR FINANCIAL 
REGIONALISM IN EAST ASIA 
 
Several of the problems that led to the crisis facing the euro area periphery will seem familiar to 
anyone who has studied or experienced the Asian financial crisis. Although the European crisis 
is special in that it involves members of a monetary union, which makes it more difficult to 
handle, it is fair to say that some of the problems could have been avoided if European 
policymakers had heeded some lessons from East Asia and other emerging regions that 
experienced crises. Some of the lessons that can be learned from  the European crisis are 
hence not new at all. Yet,  the current European crisis also holds some new lessons that 
countries contemplating different forms of regional financial and monetary cooperation and 
integration—like countries in East Asia do—should take to heart. In the following section, some 
lessons, old and new, will be discussed. 
(i) Monetary integration in East Asia should proceed very gradually 
The arguments in favor of regional monetary and exchange rate cooperation in East Asia—as 
made for example by Ogawa and Ito (2002), Kawai (2008, 2009), and Volz (2010)—remain valid 
and strong. However, the European crisis has illustrated once more that any fixed exchange 
rate arrangement (including monetary union) is prone to crisis if countries do not adjust their 
economies internally and imbalances are allowed to grow too large. If economic policies are not 
able to keep the domestic price level competitive vis-à-vis the rest of the integrating area, and 
external adjustment via the exchange rate are precluded, real exchange rate appreciation will 
erode the countries’ competitiveness. In most cases this will lead to current account deficits that 
at some point will trigger a balance of payments crisis. 
Just like the 1992 crisis of the European Monetary System, the regional fixed exchange rate 
system that preceded EMU, the current European crisis highlights the dangers that advanced 
monetary integration brings in the face of economic and political divergences. Macroeconomic 
imbalances within any kind of fixed exchange rate system will cause problems at some point. 
And these will be exacerbated by political divergences. East Asian countries should hence steer 
clear of overambitious monetary and exchange rate integration schemes, since these will 
backfire and lead to crisis. As has been pointed out before  (Volz 2006, 2010), East Asian 
                                                 
7 Article 123, §1 states: “Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank or with 
the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as “national central banks”) in favour of Union 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local  or other public authorities, other 
bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase 
directly from them by the European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments.” 
8 A similar view was expressed by Standard & Poor’s (2012), the rating agency, when it downgraded nine euro area 
countries in January 2012: “[T]he effectiveness, stability, and predictability of European policymaking and political 
institutions have not been as strong as we believe are called for by the severity of a broadening and deepening 
financial crisis in the euro area.” ADBI Working Paper 347    Volz 
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economies are not ready (yet) for a regional exchange rate system, let alone monetary union. A 
high level of political agreement and commitment is needed among countries to pursue 
successful monetary integration, as well as close macroeconomic and fiscal coordination. 
East Asian countries should pursue a very gradual approach to monetary integration that will 
allow for much flexibility and room for adjustment. Managed floating regimes guided by currency 
baskets are one option to keep relative intra-regional exchange rate stability while avoiding the 
dangers of fixed, rigid arrangements.
9
Although monetary unification is not on the current agenda in East Asia anyway, the recent 
European experience provides further reason to believe that monetary union in East Asia should 
not become a goal anytime soon (whether it should become so at a later stage is also open for 
discussion). Prior to monetary unification, Europe had a discussion on the right strategy for 
monetary unification, with two opposing schools of thought, the “Nike approach” vs. the 
“coronation theory” of monetary unification. The Nike approach (“just do it”), which assumed that 
economies would converge endogenously once monetary union is completed, seems flawed 
with hindsight. Rather, the coronation theory (or Bundesbank view) which argued that monetary 
union should be the crowning achievement after a long process of convergence and political 
integration seems vindicated. 
 Any moves towards closer monetary and exchange rate 
cooperation will require a high degree of political dedication and readiness to  subordinate 
domestic economic policies to defending the chosen exchange rate arrangement. It will also 
require a willingness to cooperate and trust among the partner countries, both of which have to 
grow over time. 
(ii) Costs and benefits of international financial integration need to be 
reconsidered 
The European crisis has highlighted once again that international financial integration will not 
automatically lead to an efficient allocation of capital, as predicted by neoclassical theory. The 
SGP’s belief in the ability of free markets to efficiently allocate capital and discipline 
governments was certainly not warranted (Mersch 2011). What we have seen instead, is that 
unrestricted  financial integration in the euro area  contributed to the development of 
unsustainable imbalances and bubbles. While financial markets underpriced sovereign risk in 
the euro’s first decade, the pendulum has swung back and gave way to excessive pessimism 
about the periphery countries’ ability to repay their debt. (In the case of Greece, the pessimism 
is certainly warranted.) Funds, now that they are needed, have dried up, forcing painful (and 
overdue) adjustment. 
The European crisis countries are currently experiencing what a large number of developing 
and emerging countries went through over the past decades: a period of strong,  yet 
unsustainable output growth fuelled by capital flow bonanzas comes to a halt at some point, 
leading to a “sudden stop” or reversal of capital flows (Reinhart and Reinhart 2009). This 
pattern, which “has often been repeated in the modern era of global finance” (Reinhart and 
Reinhart 2009: 9), and now once more in Europe, should give pause to seriously reconsider the 
costs and benefits of international financial integration. Fortunately, the global financial crisis 
and now the European crisis have not only given impetus to fresh academic thinking on this 
matter, but also led the IMF to reconsider its position on capital account management and 
regulation of international capital flows (Ostry et al. 2010, 2011). 
                                                 
9 For an analysis and discussion of different forms of currency baskets and their effects on East Asian countries’ real 
exchange rates see Volz (2010). ADBI Working Paper 347    Volz 
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Against this backdrop, East Asian countries, many of which still maintain (partial) capital 
controls, should consider carefully which types of capital flows may be beneficial for their long-
term development, and which may not be. Given that financial institutions engaging in cross-
border activities increase systemic risk and pose a serious regulatory challenge, East Asian 
countries should be careful with liberalizing financial markets too fast. For instance, the 
countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should proceed very carefully 
when working towards their declared goal of allowing a “freer flow of capital” (ASEAN 2008: 6) 
as part of building a Single Market and Production Base across ASEAN by 2015.
10
A pragmatic approach to capital account management, however, does not need to stand in 
contrast to regional financial integration. But the question of which sectors of financial markets 
should be integrated and to which extent needs to be addressed. As seen time and again, a 
greater degree of international (including regional) financial integration increases contagion risk; 
the crisis of a small European economy—Greece—triggered a full-blown European crisis not 
only because Greece happens to be a member of the euro area, but because banks and other 
financial institutions from other EU countries had built up exposure to Greece. For East Asian 
countries, there remain valid arguments to facilitate cross-issuances and integration across the 
region’s bond markets, given the relatively small size of many local bond markets as this should 
increase investors’ interest in the region and help reduce the continuing over-dependence on 
financial intermediation in US and European financial markets.
 
11
Since regional financial integration would require  at least partial liberalization of domestic 
financial regulations and cross-border restrictions on financial services and financial flows, the 
regulatory architecture needs to keep pace with financial integration. In financially integrated 
areas, close cooperation between national regulators is needed. As was realized too late in 
Europe, from a certain level of regional financial integration a regional regulatory body is needed 
to supervise financial institutions whose activities stretch across borders.
  But in view of recent 
experiences, regulators should be very cautious  when it comes to, for instance, the 
development of non-transparent securitization and credit default swaps markets, both on a 
national and regional scale. 
12
                                                 
10 The Single Market and Production Base is part of the plan for creating the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), 
the details of which are outlined in the AEC Blueprint (ASEAN 2008) that was formally approved by the ASEAN 
heads of state/government in November 2007. Plummer (2010: 15) remarks that most concrete measures 
projected in the AEC Blueprint “really refer to concerted efforts to develop national capital markets, rather than any 
grandiose regionally-integrated market.” 
 If ASEAN, or other 
groups of countries in the region, want to go ahead with regional financial integration, they need 
to ensure not only that  national regulators are up to the task, but also that appropriate 
supranational regulatory structures are put in place. This issue will be discussed further below. 
11 For an overview of various initiatives to promote bond market development in the region see, for instance, Schou-
Zibell (2008). 
12 Steps towards the creation of European supervisory authorities to help oversee Europe’s financial sector from a 
pan-European perspective were taken only in late 2008, when the president of the European Commission 
mandated a high-level expert group on financial supervision in the EU. The expert group, led by Jacques de 
Larosière, proposed three new supervisory authorities, which were established in November 2010 and started 
operation in January 2011: the European Banking Authority (EBA) based in London, the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) based in Paris, and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA) based in Frankfurt. These three supervisory authorities were complemented by the creation of the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which is responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the financial 
system within the EU and which has a secretariat hosted by the ECB. ADBI Working Paper 347    Volz 
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(iii) Crisis prevention and resolution mechanism needs to be in place before 
the next crisis 
As discussed above, establishing a crisis resolution mechanism in the midst of crisis is not easy. 
East Asian countries  have their own experience of  how difficult it is to coordinate crisis 
responses or even create a new crisis facility in the eye of the storm. When the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997–1998 hit, East Asian countries were completely unprepared to cope with such a 
crisis and the region was left at the mercy of the international community, with the IMF as the 
major crisis manager. The failed attempt at the time to set up an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) 
was not only due to external pressures from the US government and the IMF, but also due to a 
lack of support of the Japanese AMF proposal by some East Asian countries, notably the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Henning 2002). 
As a reaction to the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, the ASEAN+3 countries (ASEAN plus 
the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea) started in 2000 to build a net of bilateral financial 
support facilities known as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). The CMI was eventually expanded 
and transformed in 2010 into a multilateral arrangement—the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization (CMIM)—including all ASEAN+3 member countries as well as Hong Kong, 
China. As part of the CMIM, ASEAN+3 established its own independent regional surveillance 
agency, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) in April 2011. AMRO, which is 
based in Singapore, is in  charge of monitoring and analyzing  the  economic and financial 
soundness of regional economies and supporting the CMIM decision-making process. 
While these have been important achievements, further efforts are needed to make the CMIM 
fully functional. The CMIM, equipped with US$ 120 billion, is too small to deal with a full blown 
crisis in East Asia. An increase of available lending amounts is therefore expedient. Moreover, 
the so-called IMF link, a provision that allows member countries to draw only 20% of the agreed 
amounts without an IMF program, has thus far prevented the CMIM from becoming fully 
effective. Given the stigma that the IMF still carries in the East Asian region, it would be 
politically difficult for any government in the region to seek an IMF program. When Korea, for 
instance, needed liquidity support during the 2008 crisis, it was not considered an option for the 
government to draw on the CMI (the CMIM was not operational yet). While Korea could have 
accessed US$ 18.5 billion from various countries under the swap agreements it had agreed 
within the CMI at the time, it could have drawn only 20% of this amount (US$ 3.7 billion) without 
seeking an IMF program (Sussangkarn 2010). Instead of calling on the CMI, Bank of Korea 
sought an agreement in October 2008 with the Federal Reserve to establish a temporary 
reciprocal liquidity swap-line over US$ 30 billion. 
As Lombardi (2010: 9) points out, “although definite progress has been made, the reliability of 
the CMIM is still, technically, untested”. To make the CMIM fully operational, ASEAN+3 
countries need to discuss changes to the current provisions. This need not necessarily mean 
scrapping the IMF link, as suggested by Sussangkarn (2010) and Kawai (2010), but could also 
include recognising the IMF’s new precautionary facilities (the Flexible Credit Line [FCL] and the 
Precautionary Credit Line [PCL]) as a sufficient condition for drawing on the CMIM beyond the 
first 20% without needing to undergo a standard IMF program (Henning 2011; Volz 2012). If a 
big crisis hits the region, IMF support will be needed and therefore it will be better to work out 
the details of cooperation between the CMIM and the IMF beforehand to avoid frictions in times 
of crisis. 
East Asian countries should increase efforts to beef up the CMIM and AMRO now. There is no 
time for complacency in East Asia since risks are looming. In 2008–2009 the global financial 
crisis underscored how vulnerable the region is to external shocks (e.g., Plummer 2010). A ADBI Working Paper 347    Volz 
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worsening of the European banking crisis or any unforeseen tail risk events in another corner of 
the world may well have adverse effects on various East Asian countries, and the region should 
be prepared to respond to these promptly and decisively. 
(iv) Surveillance and monitoring of regional financial markets should be 
strengthened 
The European crisis has shown what we had already seen during the Asian crisis: crises can 
spread quickly among closely integrated economies, either through the trade channel, or the 
financial channel, or both. Among others things, East Asian countries need to manage the risks 
associated with capital inflows. Because of strong interdependences, a regional approach (in 
addition to global efforts) to volatile capital flows is called for. In an integrated region and world, 
no country can isolate itself from surrounding troubles. Since effective regulation, surveillance, 
and monitoring are the best crisis prevention, East Asian countries should reinforce efforts to 
strengthen the regional financial architecture, in complement to  strengthening domestic 
regulatory capacities and global financial cooperation.
13
An important lesson of both the global financial crisis and the European crisis is that regulatory 
authorities must not focus only on microprudential regulation and supervision of individual 
financial firms. Rather, regulatory authorities need to try to identify and manage systemic risk, 
i.e., the risks imposed by interlinkages and interdependencies in a market, where a triggering 
event, such as the failure of a large financial firm, could seriously impair financial markets and 
harm the broader economy. As pointed out by Kawai (2011: 123), “[t]here is an urgent need in 




Building on an already existing institution, East Asian countries should first of all strengthen the 
newly created AMRO, which is currently staffed with only a director and a handful of economists 
plus support staff. Much larger resources need to be devoted to AMRO to allow it to carry out 
meaningful macroeconomic and financial market surveillance. 
 
Moreover, since safeguarding financial stability is a task that involves multiple stakeholders, 
including finance ministries, central banks, and financial regulators and supervisors, it would be 
expedient  to initiate a continuous dialogue of all relevant authorities across the East Asian 
region concerned with financial and macroeconomic stability to exchange on potential sources 
of financial market vulnerabilities and discuss common issues for financial sector supervision 
and regulation.  A proposal for such a forum, named the Asian Financial Stability Dialogue 
(AFSD), was made by Asian Development Bank (ADB) President Haruhiko Kuroda in 
September 2008.
15
                                                 
13 On the issue of subsidiary see Plummer (2010: 16–17). 
 The AFSD could be thought of as a regional equivalent to the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) to promote coordination and information exchange among authorities 
responsible for financial stability. In contrast to the FSB, which includes only five East Asian 
countries as members (the PRC; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; the Republic of Korea; 
and Singapore), an AFSD could bring together the monetary and financial authorities of all East 
Asian countries. As a regional forum—which could be placed under the ASEAN+3 framework—
the AFSD could focus on issues relevant to  East Asia, including issues related to financial 
14 While macroprudential regulation to deal with capital inflows is particularly important in a monetary union where 
interest rate and exchange rate policy cannot be used at all to address the build-up of bubbles (e.g., Spain), it is 
also crucial for any kind of fixed exchange rate system where monetary policy independence is constrained (e.g., 
PRC). For macroprudential supervision and regulation across Asia, see Kawai (2011: 123). 
15 See ADB (2008, 2010) and Kawai (2011: 139). ADBI Working Paper 347    Volz 
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market development, management of capital flows,  regional financial integration, and 
contingency planning for cross-border crisis management.
16
(v) Banks need to be recapitalized swiftly after crisis 
 It could also be used as a means to 
help East Asian countries to develop and project joint positions on financial issues discussed in 
international forums and institutions, including the FSB and the IMF. 
A final lesson one may draw from the European crisis relates to the great importance of swift 
action in cleaning up the banking system once a crisis has hit. Even though this is not a new 
lesson, it is an important one, and one that was not heeded in Europe—which is indeed a major 
reason why the European banking and sovereign debt crises have been reinforcing each other, 
turning the Greek crisis into a crisis of previously inconceivable dimensions. 
Unlike in the US, where the Federal Reserve System and the  Office of Thrift Supervision 
conducted a capital assessment of the largest US financial institutions under the Supervisory 
Capital Assessment Program  (commonly referred to as the “stress test”) in spring 2009 to 
determine  whether they had sufficient capital buffers to withstand the recession and further 
financial market turmoil, no such measures were taken in time in Europe. In the stress test, the 
US authorities came to the conclusion that 10 of the country’s 19 largest financial institutions 
were  undercapitalized  and  required  them to immediately strengthen their  capital  base, a 
measure that helped to restore “trust in the institutions at the core of the US financial system” 
(Véron 2011: 3). In contrast, the “stress tests” that were conducted across Europe in September 
2009 “went virtually unnoticed as the results were not made public” (Véron 2010)—and hence 
failed to restore trust. For the second EU-wide stress tests, carried out in July 2010, bank-by-
bank results were publicly disclosed, but they nonetheless failed to restore confidence since the 
disclosures lacked specificity and comparability. Even worse, some banks that had passed the 
stress tests were exposed as undercapitalized soon afterwards. The third round of stress tests 
in July 2011, now carried out under the auspices of the EBA, was considered more credible, but 
by summer 2011 the European sovereign crisis had already unfolded. Because of European 
policymakers’ failure to re capitalize financial institutions quickly and restore trust among them, 
“Europe’s banking system has been in a continuous stage of systemic fragility since 2007–08” 
(Véron 2011: 1). As Véron (2011: 5) puts it: “Even though it is impossible to know 
counterfactuals, had the Western European banking sector been less fragile at that time, it is 
very possible that a different course would have been taken involving Greek debt restructuring 
as early as 2010, and everything afterwards would have developed very differently.” 
The lesson is clear: financial authorities must respond swiftly and decisively to banking crises 
with rapid recapitalization of banks. Europe has set a negative example in this respect. The dire 
Japanese experience in the 1990s  with too slow and insufficient action taken by regulatory 
authorities in cleaning-up up the banking sector after the burst of the real estate and stock 
bubble in 1991 should have been a warning; the swift action taken by the Swedish authorities to 
resolve the Swedish banking crisis of 1991–93 should have served as a positive example.
17
                                                 
16 Plummer (2010: 19) remarks that “[t]here are a sufficient number of critical issues of high priority in Asia but that 
are lower in importance at the global level, and vice versa, to justify an institutional cooperative structure such as 
the AFSD.” 
 
When the next banking crisis hits East Asian countries, authorities should address the problems 
quickly and decisively. To facilitate a quick response after the outbreak of a crisis, supervisory 
authorities should put in place an adequate legal and institutional framework for the resolution 
procedures. The latter is another point that should make it onto the “to-do-list” of the proposed 
AFSD. 
17 For lessons of Japan’s banking crisis see Fujii and Kawai (2010); for lessons from Sweden see Jonung (2009). ADBI Working Paper 347    Volz 
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4.  CONCLUSIONS 
The European crisis has  highlighted  what can go wrong in terms of regional financial and 
monetary integration. The crisis has exposed major deficits of the euro area’s institutional 
framework and has been compounded by an insufficient policy response. One of the major 
shortcomings that led to the European predicaments was that monetary unification was not 
accompanied by an adequate level of financial and macroeconomic cooperation among euro 
area countries. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that European monetary 
unification was a fundamentally flawed idea. There is no doubt that the (political) decision to 
allow Greece to join the euro was a grave and very costly mistake. It is also questionable 
whether Portugal should have entered the euro area. Yet the current crisis was not unavoidable: 
had Ireland regulated its financial sector more stringently, it would not be in trouble today. Had 
Spain applied macroprudential regulation to contain its property bubble, its problems today 
would be less grave. Had the PIIGS carried out structural reforms and adjusted internally in 
time, they would not face severe competitiveness problems today. If only... The vulnerabilities of 
the euro area and its individual member countries have become obvious now and ought to be 
addressed. European policymakers, despite all criticism, have responded to the crisis with far-
reaching reforms of the euro area’s institutional framework as well as structural reforms at 
home, even if government action—which in Europe after all has to be democratically legitimized 
by national parliaments—appears slow compared with the speed at which financial markets 
operate. 
Beyond Europe, the crisis provides important lessons for East Asian countries. While some of 
these lessons are not new at all, they deserve to be taken seriously. Although at first sight one 
may draw the conclusion from the European crisis that East Asian countries should abandon 
regional integration efforts, the opposite is true: East Asia needs more regional monetary and 
financial cooperation to strengthen the regional financial architecture. Regional financial and 
monetary cooperation need to keep pace with integration of the real economies of East Asia, 
which is progressing quickly. This does not imply that East Asian countries should emulate the 
European integration process or declare the long-term goal of monetary unification. East Asian 
countries will have to craft their own model of financial regionalism. And while doing this, they 
should learn from past mistakes—their own and the ones made in Europe. This paper highlights 
five lessons for regional financial and monetary cooperation and integration in East Asia: (1) do 
not rush monetary integration; (2) rethink costs and benefits of international financial integration; 
(3) develop and strengthen a regional crisis prevention and resolution mechanism before the 
next  crisis hits  the region; (4) reinforce surveillance and monitoring of East Asian  financial 
markets; and (5) put in place adequate resolution procedures and recapitalize banks swiftly 
once the banking system is in trouble. 
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